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Abstract: Content moderation has exploded as a policy, advocacy, and public concern. But these 
debates still tend to be driven by high-profile incidents and to focus on the largest, US based 
platforms. In order to contribute to informed policymaking, scholarship in this area needs to 
recognise that moderation is an expansive socio-technical phenomenon, which functions in many 
contexts and takes many forms. Expanding the discussion also changes how we assess the array of 
proposed policy solutions meant to improve content moderation. Here, nine content moderation 
scholars working in critical internet studies propose how to expand research on content 
moderation, with implications for policy. 
Issue 4 
 
This paper is part of Trust in the system, a special issue of Internet Policy Review guest-
edited by Péter Mezei and Andreea Verteş-Olteanu. 
Introduction 
By Tarleton Gillespie and Patricia Aufderheide 
Content moderation scholarship faces an urgent challenge of relevance for policy 
formation. Emerging policies will be limited if they do not draw on the kind of ex-
pansive understanding of content moderation that scholars can provide. 
Content moderation – the detection of, assessment of, and interventions taken on 
content or behaviour deemed unacceptable by platforms or other information in-
termediaries, including the rules they impose, the human labour and technologies 
required, and the institutional mechanisms of adjudication, enforcement, and ap-
peal that support it—has exploded as a public, advocacy, and policy concern: from 
harassment to misinformation to hate speech to self-harm, across questions of 
rights, labour, and collective values. Academics have explored how and why plat-
forms moderate, what kind of publics they’re producing in doing so, and what re-
sponsibilities they should hold around these interventions. This work has opened 
up even more fundamental questions about the enormous power of platforms. 
As concern about moderation has grown, scholarly attention has grown with 
it—somewhat—from specific controversies to deeper, structural questions about 
how moderation is organised and enacted. But there remains a tendency for re-
search to be driven by high-profile incidents and people: the 2016 election in the 
United States put worries about misinformation 1 front and centre; the 
Christchurch shooting pushed hate and domestic terrorism as the highest priority; 
the Covid-19 pandemic put misinformation and conspiracy back in front. 
Moreover, discussion tends to focus almost exclusively on the largest, US based 
platforms. There are good, or at least understandable reasons, why this is so. 
These platforms are enormous, and their policies affect billions of users. Their size 
makes them desirable venues for bad faith actors eager to have an impact. Their 
policies and techniques set a standard for how content moderation works on other 
platforms, they offer the most visible examples, and they drive legislative con-
1. Here we use misinformation as an umbrella term for various kinds of unreliable information. For a 
more tightly defined definition, distinguishing between misinformation, disinformation, fake news, 
and propaganda, see Carmi et al., 2020; Jack, 2017. 
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cerns. But the inordinate attention is also structural. Critics talk about Facebook 
and YouTube as stand-ins for the entire set of platforms. Journalists hang critical 
reporting on high profile decisions, blunders, and leaks from the biggest players. 
Scholars tend to empirically study one platform at a time, and tend to choose 
large, well-known platforms where problems are apparent, where data will be 
plentiful, and that are widely used by or familiar to their research subjects. 
This tendency extends to policy-making. US and European policymakers have also 
focused on the latest controversies and the biggest players. It is not surprising 
that, when the US Congress began to probe these questions, first in the hot seat 
was Mark Zuckerberg, followed soon after by senior leaders from Google, Twitter, 
and YouTube. As enormously significant and problematic as Facebook certainly is, 
it has become inordinately prominent in moderation debates—the preferred object 
of research, the go-to example in characterising the problem, the stand-in for all 
other platforms. 
Academic scholarship on content moderation can contribute to this increasingly 
urgent policy discussion, and is regularly being called on to do so. But to address 
some of these tendencies, it must be grounded in an understanding of moderation 
as an expansive socio-technical phenomenon, one that functions in many contexts 
and takes many forms. Expanding the scope and range of research on content 
moderation is critical to developing sound policy. The range of contentious phe-
nomena cannot be captured by studying just misinformation, or hate, or pornogra-
phy. The largest, US-based platforms do not provide a reliable guide for the entire 
social media ecology; innovative moderation strategies may emerge from smaller 
platforms, platforms outside of the US, and platforms that imagine themselves and 
their communities very differently than Facebook does. New platform tactics and 
new laws require more scrutiny—not just so that they may be understood, criti-
cised, and improved, but to understand how they implicitly frame the nature of the 
problem, positioning some approaches as on the table for discussion and sweep-
ing others out of view. 
And any policy enacted to regulate moderation or curb online harms, 2 while it may 
reasonably have Facebook or YouTube in its sights, will probably in practice apply 
to all platforms and user-content services. In that case, the result could further 
2. While online harms as a term gets used more generally, it also harks to the UK's Online Harms 
White Paper (2019), which takes the first step in developing a new regulatory framework for online 
safety and "make clear companies’ responsibilities to keep UK users, particularly children, safer on-
line". https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper/online-harms-
white-paper. 
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consolidate the power of the biggest tech companies, those best able to manage 
the regulatory burdens. This has been a concern in related areas, for example pri-
vacy (Krämer & Stüdlein, 2019) and copyright protection (Samuelson, 2019; 
Romero-Moreno, 2019). If power asymmetries are to be challenged, we need to un-
derstand how different values are engineered into these mechanisms across a 
wider array of examples. 
And, so much may change in the wake of the global Covid-19 pandemic, not only 
about how content moderation is accomplished, but the broader position of social 
media platforms amid democratic life and theories of public responsibility. Our 
scrutiny and our efforts should look very different when we pull the lens back 
from the usual suspects, to understand content moderation more deeply and holis-
tically. 
In this, cross-disciplinary work is critical, since legal, engineering, communication, 
political and economic issues are all at stake. The set of proposals that follow 
comes from critical internet scholars, and we hope that it encourages a broader 
and cross-disciplinary conversation. As a starting point to a larger discussion, each 
of our authors provides a suggestion for expanding the study of content modera-
tion, with the ultimate goal of sound policy grounded in human rights and open 
societies. The first group of authors considers specific applications and processes 
across a wider variety of platforms. The second reexamines the implications of 
content moderation for the health of open societies. The third considers the future 
of governance, particularly governmental regulation. 
1. Looking beyond Facebook 
Moderation everywhere 
By Tarleton Gillespie 
If we want to encourage a more expansive understanding of content moderation 
and the policies that regulate it, both the public and the scholarly debates we’re 
having today are dangerously narrow. We need to grasp the breadth and depth of 
moderation, across the entire ecosystem of content provision and deep into the in-
frastructural stack of distribution; and we need to understand how the practices 
and effects of moderation are interconnected in ways that warrant greater atten-
tion. 
While it deserves its share of scrutiny, too often we take Facebook—the software, 
the company, its methods, and its problems - as a proxy for platforms more broad-
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ly. This can be deeply limiting. If nothing else, there are many kinds of social me-
dia platforms that configure content moderation differently (Caplan, 2019). Plat-
forms also differ in ways that affect how content moderation works: by size, reach, 
and language, most obviously, but also by technical design, genre, corporate ethos, 
business model, and stated purpose. And moderation also happens on sites and 
services quite different from Facebook: on comment threads and discussion fo-
rums, in multi-player game worlds, in app stores, on dating sites, and on the many 
service, labour, and crowdfunding platforms of the gig economy. 
We tend to think about moderation as being performed by and on individual plat-
forms. But moderation, in both its practices and its effects, overlaps in important 
ways. While each platform comes up with its own rules and procedures separately, 
there can be a great deal of similarity in the ways these rules are phrased, and in 
the way violations are understood. There is intense exchange between the policy 
teams at major US platforms, both through the actual personnel moving from job 
to job, and through more informal points of professional contact. Major platforms 
keep an eye on each other, and in some moments even appear to act in con-
cert—the deplatforming of Alex Jones only being the most striking example (Kraus, 
2018). And while the actual work of moderation is generally conducted by each 
platform individually, there are important ways in which they collaborate. Separate 
platforms owned by the same parent company, like Instagram and Facebook, share 
resources. Smaller platforms outsource their moderation to a small set of third-
party services, which deploy the same software and human teams across their 
clients’ sites. And while antitrust law may still discourage large-scale collabora-
tion, recent years have seen the formation of what Evelyn Douek (2020) calls con-
tent cartels—for instance, GIFCT, a database overseen by a set of platform compa-
nies, used to track and share content that at least one participating company has 
identified as terrorist propaganda (regardless of whether their criteria align). 
Moderation also overlaps in the experience of creators and users. While platforms 
may function independently as institutions, from the user’s perspective these ser-
vices coexist; they are options to choose from, or to use in tandem. Many of those 
who develop a public voice online depend on multiple platforms and services: a 
political provocateur might be active on YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook; their sus-
tained public presence may also depend on Paypal to handle payment services, Pa-
treon for donations, Threadless to sell their merch, a Mailchimp newsletter, 
EventBrite for organising events, Google AdSense for their advertising. Each of 
these might decide that their content violates their standards. While none of these 
components may be essential by themselves—it is not as if I have been silenced if 
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I simply cannot process incoming donations or sell t-shirts—being banned by all of 
them at once does begin to approach something like censorship, more so than just 
being suspended from Twitter, at least in a way that our current thinking about 
content moderation has yet to address. 
The moderation field is not only wide, it’s also deep. Moderation decisions get 
made all up and down the infrastructural stack of services, often in ways that are 
much more opaque than the decisions made by Facebook and the like (Masnick, 
2018; Plantin et al., 2018; van Dijck et al., 2019). Web hosting and site manage-
ment services make decisions about which sites are simply beyond the pale—a fact 
made most apparent in 2017 when the CEO of Cloudflare announced he was no 
longer willing to host the white nationalist site Daily Stormer (Johnson, 2018), 
even as he publicly lamented that he shouldn’t have the power to make such a de-
cision (Prince, 2017). 
Cloud computing services also moderate, not by removing particular bits of con-
tent, but by rejecting whole sites or entire platforms. Typically, services like Ama-
zon Web Services or Microsoft Azure claim a position of neutrality, preferring not 
to be in the business of picking and choosing, drawing on the protections of Sec-
tion 230 of the Communication Decency Act (CDA 230) and the sensibility of net 
neutrality enjoyed by ISPs. At the same time they reserve the right, in their terms of 
service or contractual agreements, to drop any client for a wide range of reasons. 3 
The decisions they make do not look like platform moderation, in that they are not 
procedural, consistent, or accountable: most happen in the context of a specific 
business relationship, where a problematic client will be quietly released from 
their contract and urged to find another provider. This was apparent when Mi-
crosoft was accused of threatening to ban right-wing social media platform Gab af-
ter a complaint came in to customer service; Microsoft apologised for the confu-
sion (Lecher, 2018), and Gab made noise about its rights being threatened. But lat-
er, Microsoft urged their client to leave, a move that had much the same effect (In-
gram, 2018). This is content moderation, by other means. 
Moderation at an infrastructural level is not only harder to see or hold account-
able, it can create stacks, where one intermediary must abide by the rules of anoth-
er, meaning users are regulated by both together, in ways difficult to discern. For 
3. See for example, the “Acceptable Use Policy” (last updated 2016) for Amazon Web Services, their 
cloud computing service: “We reserve the right, but do not assume the obligation, to investigate 
any violation of this Policy or misuse of the Services or AWS Site. We may… remove, disable access 
to, or modify any content or resource that violates this Policy or any other agreement we have with 
you for use of the Services or the AWS Site.” 
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instance, platforms that function largely in the mobile ecosystem find that their 
standards must be aligned with that of Apple, otherwise their app may be dropped 
from their App Store. A service looking to be more flexible, progressive, or permis-
sive might find itself constrained by a more conservative or capricious infrastruc-
tural provider; and rules implemented further down the stack are even less evident 
to users, and less available for critique (Tusikov, 2019). 
Policies that understand the stacked and overlapping qualities of moderation 
across the information ecosystem will be better suited to addressing more sys-
temic problems. For example, if many service providers start making moderation 
decisions that align—because they see problems in the same ways, or because 
there is political cover in acting in concert - the entire information environment 
may tend towards ideological consistency. Speakers banned across the many 
stacked and overlapping services will experience deplatforming to a much deeper 
degree. On the other hand, if all the nodes on the network set their own policies, 
in ways that are different and changing and capricious and opaque, those with 
contentious things to say will face an unpredictable landscape, an uncertainty in-
hospitable to their ability to speak publicly. 
Encryption poses distinct new problems: the case of WhatsApp 
By Ariadna Matamoros-Fernández 
The content moderation debate needs to expand to a broader range of popular 
platforms that are making important shifts in the development of social media. 
WhatsApp, launched in 2009 and acquired by Facebook in 2014, is paradigmatic of 
social media’s shift towards more private, integrated, and encrypted services 
(Zuckerberg, 2019). WhatsApp can be understood as social media insofar as con-
tent sharing among small and large groups, public communication, interpersonal 
connection, and commercial transactions converge in key features of the app. The 
platform’s rise and immense popularity in key markets like India, Brazil, and In-
donesia opens up new challenges not only for content moderation on the app, but 
also for the regulation of platforms by governments. 
First, WhatsApp has quickly evolved from a one-to-one chat service to a global so-
cial media platform, and has introduced a number of new technical fixes to the 
problem of information disorder (Wardle, 2018) and abuse. Despite encryption, 
WhatsApp moderates content both at the account and content level. At the account 
level, the company uses machine learning to detect abusive behaviour, disables 
over two million accounts per month, and scans unencrypted information such as 
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profile pictures, which has been instrumental in detecting child pornography activ-
ity within the app (WhatsApp, 2019). 
At the content level, accusations of disinformation and mob violence (Newman et 
al., 2019; Rajput et al., 2018) pushed WhatsApp to implement measures to curb 
the virality of problematic messages. Unregulated virality on the app depends on a 
combination of WhatsApp’s main technical affordances: encryption, groups of up to 
256 people, and the forward function. Most of the groups on the platform are fam-
ily and friends, local community and neighbourhood groups of less than ten peo-
ple (Lu, 2019). In these intimate spaces, one might think that content moderation 
would not be needed at all. However, in countries like Brazil, Malaysia and India, 
some WhatsApp groups can be much larger and act as semi-public forums (Banaji 
et al., 2019; Caetano et al., 2018). The sharing of news and the discussion of poli-
tics are popular; this communication takes place among strangers, and context col-
lapse may occur (Newman et al., 2019). The combination of large groups and 
users’ unlimited ability to forward messages helped information on WhatsApp be 
easily shared “at scale, potentially encouraging the spread of misinformation" 
(Newman et al., 2019, p. 9). 
Growing demands from users, activists, and policymakers that WhatsApp take 
greater responsibility for this glut of misinformation on its network have pushed 
the platform to provide more content moderation mechanisms to users. In 2018, 
the company limited the number of times a user could forward a specific message, 
from twenty to five, and it began labelling forwarded messages to help users dis-
tinguish content shared by friends and family from content forwarded from else-
where (Hern, 2018). WhatsApp has also begun labelling messages forwarded more 
than five times as “Frequently forwarded”. In August 2020, the company launched a 
pilot feature in seven countries including Brazil, Mexico, and the US: a magnifying 
glass icon next to messages that have been shared more than five times allows 
users to upload these links via their browsers. The feature is meant to facilitate 
users’ ability to fact-check viral messages outside the app (WhatsApp, 2020). And, 
amidst the Covid-19 infodemic (World Health Organization, 2020) and illustrating a 
classic governance by shock move (Ananny & Gillespie, 2016), WhatsApp imposed a 
new limit so that messages shared many times could only be forwarded to one 
chat at a time (WhatsApp Blog, 2020). 
Forwarding messages decreased by 25% globally as a direct result of the imple-
mentation of some of these measures (WhatsApp, 2019). These claims, though, 
cannot be validated by external research, since only WhatsApp has access to be-
havioural patterns on the app—from group size to viral media. More research on 
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users’ experiences with problematic messages on the app, and their responses to 
WhatsApp’s new features to curb the spread of abuse and misleading content, is 
needed in order to evaluate the efficiency of these measures and explore alterna-
tives to the challenges of content moderation on this platform. 
Second, encryption also complicates the debates around how to regulate platforms 
in order to tackle the circulation of problematic content in digitally mediated 
spaces. And again, WhatsApp offers the most striking example. Serious offences on 
WhatsApp, such as terrorist and criminal activity, have led governments to pressure 
Facebook to provide ‘backdoor access’ to encrypted messages on the service. But 
breaking encryption in this way would compromise activists using the app to cir-
cumvent state censorship and surveillance (Johns, 2020; Treré, 2020). Australia 
alone has succeeded in passing a law that gives the government new powers with 
regard to snooping encrypted data. The Telecommunications and Other Legislation 
Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018 (Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2018) requires digital intermediaries to provide federal police and in-
telligence agencies with “technical assistance” to access encrypted conversations 
from criminal suspects. Other countries may follow. India is drafting a new law on 
data protection that contemplates different exceptions for the processing and 
hosting of user data by the Indian government (Sharma, 2019). These examples 
put WhatsApp and other encrypted platforms, such as Telegram and Signal, at the 
centre of global debates around content moderation, user privacy, security, and 
freedom of expression. The pervasiveness of encrypted platforms in mediating 
everyday life in some parts of the world is a reminder that viable content modera-
tion measures without breaking encryption are needed. Some argue that automat-
ed content moderation for encrypted services could be done locally on users’ de-
vices without requiring ‘backdoor’ access and compromising security (Mayer, 2016; 
Reis et al., 2020). But the development and implementation of these measures will 
require joint efforts between platforms, civil society, and governments. 
‘Too good to be true’: the challenges of regulating social media 
startups 
By Ysabel Gerrard 
In the content moderation debate, we need to carefully consider how best to regu-
late social apps that are either new or have become too big too quickly. New apps 
that lack substantive planning or an institutional apparatus for content modera-
tion often become so overwhelmed by problems like cyberbullying and unsolicited 
explicit image sharing that they collapse, either because they are quickly removed 
9 Gillespie et al.
from app stores or because their founders shut them down. On the other hand, vi-
ral success, without internal processes that adjust to legal and regulatory require-
ments, raises the risk of real harm to social media users. 
Failed social media app Fling can help highlight this problem. Founded in 2014, 
Fling invited users to send photos and videos to complete strangers around the 
world. Fling was an instant hit, but the app was quickly overrun with pornographic 
images designed to harass female users, leading to its removal from Apple’s App 
Store (Nardone, 2015). Despite employing “a full-time team devoted to keeping 
dicks at bay” (Nardone, 2015) and spending “all hours of the day and night trying 
to build a new version of the app that met Apple's guidelines” (Shead, 2017), Fling 
could not recover. As Fling’s founder and former CEO put it, the app’s rapid success 
“seemed too good to be true…and it was” (Nardone, 2015). Content moderation 
challenges were not the only problem at Fling (see Shead, 2017), but the app’s 
failures highlight the many uncertain, expensive, and risky steps that startups like 
Fling feel they must make in their early days, and which might make heavy regula-
tory obligations hard to meet. 
The anonymous app Secret offers another example. Founded in 2017, Secret al-
lowed users to anonymously share a “secret” with friends who also used the app. 
Secret was extremely popular with young people and was at one point the most-
downloaded app in eight countries (Katz, 2017), but users’ bad behaviour simply 
became too much for the team to manage. Secret’s former CEO David Byttow said 
his team “couldn’t contain it, could not control it” (cited in Katz, 2017). Byttow shut 
the app down in 2015. 
This is a common origin and downfall story for many social media startups: plat-
forms like Fling and Secret do not collapse because they are unpopular, but be-
cause they are too popular, leaving their founders unprepared for the scale of con-
tent moderation necessary. Apps like Fling and Secret thus pose distinct chal-
lenges to content moderation policy because they are often popular-by-surprise; 
that is, their founders do not expect them to reach such dizzying heights of suc-
cess so quickly. At the height of their popularity, some new apps rival their more 
“traditional” competitor platforms in number of users. But at new companies like 
Fling, start-up sized workforces—especially content moderation teams - might be 
woefully inadequate. 
Effective content moderation requires a great deal of knowledge and expertise, 
and the spectacular failures of some social media startups suggests that this 
knowledge is often gained too late, or not at all. Moreover, not all tech startups as-
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sume they will make money early on (Crain, 2014), which means the moderation 
knowledge and staffing problems that come with popularity-by-surprise are baked 
into current business and growth models. As Crain explains, growth—“investing in 
technology, and buying competitors” (2014, p. 379)—often comes first, and profit 
follows. And startup apps are also very much at the mercy of Apple and Google. As 
Suzor explains, given the legal reality that the companies behind social media 
platforms “have almost absolute power over how they are run” (2019, p. 11), it is 
digital intermediaries like app store owners that often decide when a social media 
startup becomes too unsafe. 
This presents anyone who is invested in content moderation with some questions: 
what would be appropriate and effective content moderation processes for social 
media startups? Do startups warrant looser obligations than the more established 
players, or tighter ones? And would one-size-fits-all regulation, intended to apply 
to platforms like YouTube and Facebook, stifle startups before they could start, or 
produce a minimum expectation that would prevent unprepared apps like Fling 
and Secret from launching? 
At present, no countries have (to my knowledge) laws requiring social media star-
tups to have content moderation workforces at all, or for them to take a particular 
shape. But attention to and regulation of social media content moderation is grow-
ing. For example, the United Kingdom’s Online Harms legislation proposes holding 
online businesses to account for harmful content: for failing in their duty of care
(Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 2020). Meanwhile, Germany’s 
Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) forces “platforms to ensure that ‘obviously un-
lawful content’ is deleted within 24 hours” (Heldt, 2019, p. 1). 
Regulatory obligations like these create two issues for social media startups. First, 
any law requiring a social media company to be responsive, especially within a 
certain timeframe, surely more or less requires that there be someone present to 
do the responding. The stories of app failures told above, and the increasingly 
global push for greater regulation, suggest a need to regulate startups differently 
to the big players. Second, fining companies for failing in their duty of care would 
likely kill off some popular-by-surprise apps (for a similar argument, see Hern, 
2019). 
The history of online regulation is repeatedly told with an eye to the big players. 
As Gorwa (2019a, p. 10) notes, it might have seemed ‘bizarre’ that Ask.fm—a site 
designed for asking questions anonymously, and which got the blame for a num-
ber of teen suicides (Henley, 2013) - was part of the European Commission’s EU In-
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ternet Forum in 2014, alongside Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter. But 
smaller, explosively popular apps can be useful regulatory cases too, even if they 
have already failed. 
The focus on established social media companies means that both the debate and 
the regulations it produces are likely to be ill-suited to the growing pains of flash-
in-the-pan apps. Do startups need looser regulations so they can grow? Or do they 
need stricter rules, because a lack of regulation might make their users more vul-
nerable to harm? It depends on what you are asking, and regulation that is atten-
tive to this category of companies has to wrestle with both possibilities. But poli-
cies that only imagine established platforms like YouTube and Facebook are never 
going to accommodate the unique challenges popular-by-surprise apps present. To 
address this, policymakers could commit to supporting startups when they grow 
faster than planned and do not have enough staff for content moderation, or could 
provide new social apps with the knowledge and expertise to develop better, safer 
systems. 
2. Moderation, community, and democracy 
Democracy cannot survive algorithmic content moderation 
By Aram Sinnreich 
Any policy meant to improve social media content moderation must attend to how 
moderation is actually done. Other scholars (Carmi, 2019; Caplan, 2019; Roberts, 
2019) have highlighted the complexities of affective and immaterial aspects of the 
human labour involved in content moderation. I would like to address the flip side 
of this concern: namely, the social and political challenges emerging from algo-
rithmic content moderation practices, and the potential risks involved when we 
delegate these kinds of decisions to artificial intelligence and other nonhuman 
processes. I believe it is essential to include these kinds of questions in any debate 
about content moderation. To ignore them would be a tacit acceptance of the le-
gitimacy of these systems, without adequate critical investigation. Furthermore, 
laws or regulations that fail to anticipate and address proactively the broader im-
plications of automated content moderation will—like all policies that overlook 
second-order and longer-term consequences—likely create as many problems as 
they solve. 
For years, algorithms have been promoted as essential to content moderation 
practices, from the automatic facial anonymisation algorithms on Google Street 
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View (Ruchaud & Dugelay, 2016) to the proposed (but yet-to-be-implemented) au-
tomated copyright policing outlined in Article 17 of the EU Copyright Directive 
(Bridy, 2020; Quintais, 2020). Additionally, algorithms are often treated as a failsafe 
for times and situations in which human content moderators are unavailable or 
prohibitively expensive. For instance, during the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020, Face-
book opted not to delegate some of its sensitive moderation practices to American 
workers confined to their homes, and instead chose to police certain violations of 
its terms of service (e.g., pornography, terrorism, and hate speech) using automated 
systems (Dwoskin & Tiku, 2020; Thomas, 2020). At the time of writing, it is unclear 
whether and when these content moderation labour forces will return to their pre-
pandemic employment levels. 
The most obvious deficiency of automated content moderation is the greater risk 
of false positives and negatives: an educational video about breastfeeding may be 
mislabeled as pornography, while weaponised disinformation may be promoted in 
the same way as a news article from a reputable source. But the greater risk of al-
gorithmic content moderation comes in its tacit threats to democratic norms and 
institutions (Sinnreich, 2018). There are several mechanisms by which this may 
happen. 
Quantisation of culture. It is the inevitable result of delegating nuanced and contex-
tualised cultural decision-making (and meaning-making) processes to an algo-
rithm. The fair use doctrine of American copyright law, establishing whether in-
fringement has occurred, requires a judgment call about the context of use, and is 
thus famously resistant to algorithmic assessment (Aufderheide & Jaszi, 2018). 
Similarly, US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously declined in 1964 to 
define “obscenity”, arguing that, in the absence of a hard and fast rubric, “I know it 
when I see it” (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964). In other words, our definitions of permissi-
ble and impermissible expression depend upon human judgment, rooted in cultur-
al context. They were designed to be so. If we delegate these decisions wholly to 
algorithms, not only will they make wrong decisions, out of keeping with organic 
cultural values, they will have the effect of reifying algorithmic logic as the arbiter 
of meaning and legitimacy, displacing these organic processes epistemologically 
and impoverishing our cultural spheres. Some, such as Shoshana Zuboff (2018), 
even propose we are seeing an emergent surveillance capitalism that will create our 
futures, with predictive products. 
Institutional convergence. A cornerstone of functional democracy is the separation 
of powers (Vibert, 2007). At every level of governance, this means that the respon-
sibilities for making laws, evaluating lawfulness, executing laws, and meting out 
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penalties are delegated to different institutions, operating independently of one 
another. Platform content moderation, however it is performed, violates this princi-
ple by delegating virtually all legislative, judicial, and executive functions to a sin-
gle, unaccountable, privately-controlled entity. That entity itself is of course sub-
ject to judicial oversight and statutory limits, and the algorithm is frequently de-
veloped in response to the parameters set by such legal requirements. In some 
cases (for instance, Facebook’s turn to the non-profit news outlet Correctiv in Ger-
many) third parties might be invoked for particular services. But the corporate en-
tity still gets to set the terms. 
When this moderation is performed via algorithm, even the fig leaf of ethical hu-
man oversight and accountability is removed from the process (Gorwa et al., 2020). 
Not only can this produce a discriminatory public sphere in which open debate 
cannot possibly flourish, but like the quantisation of culture, this process actually 
threatens to undermine democratic epistemologies. In other words, when con-
sumers accept automatic oversight of platforms as an appropriate form of gover-
nance, it paves the way for citizens to accept autocracy as an appropriate form of 
government. And of course, as Julie Cohen meticulously shows, platforms are ea-
gerly seizing governance by exploiting neoliberal loopholes in today’s governing 
institutions (Cohen, 2019). 
Expansion of scale. Laws, and the cultural values that shape both statute and ju-
risprudence, are local, regional, and national in scale. Platforms, however, are glob-
al. When we delegate important decisions about public speech to algorithms oper-
ated by these platforms, we undermine national sovereignty and self-determina-
tion, creating the conditions for corporatocracy and monoculture. Unlike constitu-
tional governments, corporations have no duty to uphold democratic values; in 
fact, their fiduciary duties often run counter to these values. Some (e.g. Kaye, 2019; 
Jørgensen, 2019; Suzor, 2019), are looking to global values such as human rights 
to structure a counter-movement to this threat. 
In short, whatever challenges are posed by human labour being exploited for the 
purposes of platform content moderation, we must not lose sight of the equal or 
greater challenges we face when those decisions are delegated to opaque, unac-
countable, privately owned algorithms. Nothing less than the future of democratic 
society is at stake. 
Thinking beyond content in the debate about moderation 
By Sarah Myers West 
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Content moderation may be too limited a term to describe the kinds of actions plat-
forms take in response to user behaviour. As this issue rises on the policy agenda, 
alongside emerging concerns about hate speech, extremist content, the spread of 
misinformation, and online abuse, the content moderation discussion has largely 
centred on its speech dimensions—as being primarily about content. Given the cen-
tral role platforms play in mediating our social, economic, and political lives, we 
are in need of a more expansive way to account for how platforms enact their poli-
cies, and how users struggle with them. 
In research I conducted with users whose social media accounts had been sus-
pended for community guidelines violations, the impacts that stood out most had 
little to do with their speech (West, 2018). Users felt cut off from their loved ones 
by the suspension of their account, because Facebook was their primary means of 
communication with far-flung relatives. Disabled users worried that if their health 
deteriorated, nobody in their network would know if they didn’t have access to 
their account. Artists reported their follower counts were wiped out entirely after 
access to their Instagram accounts was restored, losing the primary means through 
which they sold their work. Alternative media outlets reported being unable to 
function when their admins received automatic 30-day bans from the platform 
they published on. And users found they were cut off from not only the platform 
they were banned from, but also the third-party login infrastructures that rely on 
Facebook and Google logins. Ysabel Gerrard (Gerrard 2018; McCosker & Gerrard, 
2020) similarly points to how companies using commercial content moderation 
struggle when they encounter users’ experiences with their own behavioural and 
mental health challenges. 
The content moderation debate should expand beyond treating platforms as pri-
marily venues for public speech, or as silos that exist in isolation from one another. 
Instead, we might think of them as a web of private infrastructures that we tra-
verse in our digitally mediated lives. For years, they have done much more than of-
fer us platforms for communication and the sharing of user generated content 
(Steinberg, 2020; Nieborg & Helmond, 2018): they are also marketplaces, payment 
systems, advertisers, gaming sites, and media distributors (Swartz, 2020; Acker & 
Murthy, 2018; Napoli & Caplan, 2017; Leaver & Wilson, 2016; Nieborg, 2015). In 
so doing, they have enmeshed themselves with the wider web and with deeper 
layers of existing non-digital infrastructures, acquiring a scale and indispensability 
that requires us to shift the kinds of questions we ask about them (Helmond, 2015; 
Plantin et al., 2018; Plantin & Punathambekar, 2018). Because the business mod-
els of the companies that run these platforms rely on the acquisition and integra-
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tion of multiple service offerings, our activities in any one node can have reverber-
ating effects across a wide web of private infrastructures. Perhaps the debate 
around moderation would be more robust if we thought about platform decision-
making in a way that better acknowledges this impact. Rather than thinking about 
content moderation in terms of its effects on speech alone, we should instead con-
sider the ripple effects that moderation can have on the social fabric of our com-
munities, by influencing our access to platforms that are increasingly central to our 
ability to work, live, and thrive together. 
Out with the deviant, in with the social 
By Elinor Carmi 
What kind of world do you want to live in? This is the question that guides plat-
forms when they produce the (commercial) spaces we use every day. The biggest 
platforms (e.g., Youtube, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram) use commercial content 
moderators (Roberts, 2019) to shape this world every day, according to ever-chang-
ing guidelines. But content moderation is certainly not the only way platforms 
shape our information worlds. Examining what content moderators do and what it 
means more broadly to the field of media and communication requires tuning into 
a larger question about how our mediated experience is shaped. In my book Media 
Distortions (Carmi, 2020a), I show how content moderators are part of a longer his-
tory of filtering between the noise and the signal—a decision-making process dis-
cerning what is deviant and what is the norm. While deviant may be interpreted 
differently depending on the medium, company, country etc., it stands for the way 
media companies want to decide for us how we should experience and perform a 
certain kind of sociality. I call this practice rhythmedia (Carmi 2020b)—the way me-
dia companies render people, objects, and their relations as rhythms and (re)order 
them for economic purposes, to produce a certain kind of sociality. Consider two 
examples. 
Going back to the early 20th century, what was considered deviant was often 
termed “noise”. In 1929, Bell Telephone Company joined the Noise Abatement 
Commission (NAC) to measure New York City and create a noise map (Thompson, 
2004). The people who formed this Commission came from various interest 
groups, like real estate and insulation companies, who wanted to reorder the city 
to become more commercially oriented. Bell measured spaces and people across 
the city with its own tools and units to establish what is sound (normal/healthy) 
and what is noise (abnormal/sick), to create a dynamic database (I call this practice 
processed listening [Carmi, 2019]). The people who were categorised as noisy in-
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cluded African-Americans, street pushcarts (mostly “foreigners”), and union pro-
testers—in other words, people whose behaviours harmed the business models of 
the NAC/Bell. The NAC conducted rhythmedia by orchestrating the rhythm of the 
city - the way all the components (people and roads, buildings and automobiles) 
were tempo-spatially ordered (Carmi, 2020). 
Almost a century later, what is considered deviant is termed “antisocial”. Social me-
dia companies use various tools, both human (commercial content moderation) 
and nonhuman (algorithms, interface/default design), to shape our experiences in 
their platforms. Recently we learned that TikTok’s guidelines instructed their con-
tent moderators to filter out people and spaces who are deviant (Biddle et al., 
2019). The company argued that this approach was meant to prevent bullying, but 
the leaked documents suggest it was to attract new users, because deviant posts 
“decrease the short-term new user retention rate” (ibid). The platform conducts 
processed listening for everything that is happening in its space, and if you are old, 
ugly, disabled, fat or activist, then content moderators would algorithmically pun-
ish you by suspending or even permanently banning your account, or by narrowing 
the distribution of your post (Kuo, 2019)—muting your voice. If you live in poor ar-
eas, like slums, you would also be silenced from what other people can listen to in 
order to “retain new users and grow the app” (ibid). In other words, you would be 
excluded from what the platform considers as social, because your appearance, 
condition, opinion, or environment do not yield more profit for the company. But 
filtering important information and people from social media has serious conse-
quences on our health, accommodation, and politics. It shapes our experience and 
how we understand the world around us. 
What does it mean for us? As media scholars we need to expand our research be-
yond platforms and understand what these actions mean for the wider politics of 
commercialising our public spaces, especially with the Internet of Things and smart 
cities being heralded as the future. Moreover, the myth of these systems being 
completely automated is a lie - what Astra Taylor (2018) terms fauxtomation. There 
is always a decision-making process behind categorising behaviours and people as 
deviant, but so far these have been hidden and unaccountable. What does amplify-
ing it mean for our autonomy, understanding, and imagination? Finally, to establish 
what is considered deviant, media companies have normalised tracking, measur-
ing, categorising, and recording our mediated lives. We do not know how these 
archives can and will be used to categorise some of us as deviant, but we need to 
demand and create a different setting for our mediated lives. 
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3. The future of regulating content moderation 
Content moderation has a regulatory politics 
By Robert Gorwa 
In the past few years, scholars, activists, and journalists have done invaluable work 
that has helped us further understand the complex infrastructures of content mod-
eration (Gillespie, 2018; Roberts, 2019; Suzor, 2019). But even as conversations 
about governing content on platforms have captured the public conversation, 
rapidly becoming one of the most talked-about aspects of information policy in 
Europe and North America today, our understanding of the political and regulatory 
dynamics around content moderation remains limited. How are the content policy 
processes of companies like Facebook affected by pressure from policymakers, and 
shaped by regulatory commitments made in various jurisdictions? What are the 
strategies that policymakers use to get firms to change their rules, either regional-
ly or globally? What are the factors that determine the success of these efforts? 
These are critical questions that will require interdisciplinary policy and legal work 
as content moderation continues to become a hotly contested global public policy 
issue. 
A more explicitly political research programme that foregrounds public policy and 
regulatory studies should help us better understand content moderation as politi-
cal relationship between what I have previously outlined as a platform governance 
triangle of political actors (Gorwa, 2019a): individual firms and industry associa-
tions; non-governmental civil society groups, individuals, journalists, and re-
searchers; regulators, policymakers, and various political institutions. To what ex-
tent does a government’s ability to shape private content policies hinge on market 
power, as opposed to their regulatory capacity or their ability to effectively mo-
bilise coalitions of consumers (Drezner, 2008; Culpepper & Thelen, 2019)? Similar-
ly, there is so much that we still don’t know about the dynamics of how platform 
companies exert influence politically — how they lobby, build advocacy campaigns, 
and leverage other tactics to push back against policymakers, and how these 
strategies might mirror or differ from what large multinationals in other industries 
have done for over a century (Hofferberth, 2019; Mikler, 2018; Fuchs, 2009). These 
are not merely academic points for debate: they have major policy implications for 
citizens, civil society, and policymakers. What are the civil society strategies that 
work best as they fight to push content regulation in a more rights-preserving di-
rection (Jørgensen, 2019)? What strategies could countries in the Global South pur-
sue to ensure adequate justice for their citizens within processes shaped predomi-
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nantly in the US and the EU? 
These complex questions fall outside the scope of what has thus been the main-
stream of content moderation research. They will likely require a consideration of 
domestic political factors, transnational linkages among policymakers, changes in 
international governance institutions, and other trends in modern, global, regula-
tory governance. Such questions far exceed the traditional wheelhouses of schol-
ars trained in communication, digital media, or platform studies. Nevertheless, as 
more governments implement regulatory measures—or steer voluntary and infor-
mal standards setting organisations that are operated by industry (see Douek, 
2019; Gorwa, 2019b) - the policy ecosystem that affects how companies design, 
implement, and enforce their content standards has become increasingly complex. 
If we wish to expand the scholarly debate around content moderation to better 
keep up with these developments, we should seek to grow this interdisciplinary 
conversation further, recruiting political scientists, regulatory politics researchers, 
and public policy academics and practitioners to join the digital media researchers 
and legal scholars that have driven the discussion thus far. 
Commercial content moderation is a soft economic and political 
tool 
By Sarah T. Roberts 
Content moderation as regulated under CDA 230—the US law that both exempts 
ISPs from legal responsibility for their users’ actions and also permits them to 
moderate on their platforms without losing that exemption—is a tool of soft power 
for US-based global firms intent on proliferating that standard worldwide. 
Issues in content moderation include labour conditions (Roberts, 2019), user rights 
(Langvardt, 2018), and globalisation (Uy-Tioco, 2019). But there is also a fight un-
derway for control between firms and governments. Regulatory debates follow on 
the recognition that content moderation has significant human rights and geopo-
litical implications (Banchik, 2020). American firms’ indemnity for the digital mate-
rial flowing through their branded services under CDA 230 is now central to this 
regulatory debate. It gives them incredible discretion, because they are free from 
the liability experienced by most media firms (Sylvain, 2019). Recent Congressional 
hearings have revealed that the firms and their allies (such as advocacy organisa-
tion Electronic Frontier Foundation), have lobbied for or supported the inclusion of 
CDA 230-like language in transnational trade agreements. This could greatly ex-
pand the scope of the policy, at a time when it is publicly being questioned in the 
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United States (Nix & Kern, 2019). This expansion of indemnity represents an expo-
nential leap in the power and reach of US-based social media firms. 
Meanwhile, just as the public has become aware of content moderation, it has also 
grown in importance for the digital services that require it. Just a few years ago, 
the major Silicon Valley social media firms still relegated large-scale moderation 
of user-generated content (UGC) to an afterthought, at best (Chen, 2014). One is-
sue that C-suite denizens were most likely to avoid was the way the practice of 
moderation, both mission-critical (from a brand protection and advertiser relations 
perspective) and also one of the most stigmatised parts of their media production 
chain, puts the lie to the claim that these global social media firms were mere en-
gines of free speech. Firms avoided conversations about content moderation 
whenever possible, choosing instead to wow a largely co-opted tech media sector 
with the latest advancement in functionality (Stewart, 2017). 
Yet it became increasingly clear, through the work of journalists, academics and 
whistleblowers, that moderation decision-making actually constituted something 
so potent that law professor Kate Klonick described the platforms as the new gov-
ernors (2018). At the same time, by keeping content moderation largely invisible to 
most users, these platforms constructed a social media ecosystem that most users 
had no idea was mediated. Ultimately, low-status, low-wage, and easily-replaced 
content moderators, working in the heart of Silicon Valley, were some of the first to 
make connections between their work and its implications (Roberts, 2017). With-
out the push from civil society, academics, and reporters to take up their revela-
tions and make content moderation more transparent (Crawford & Gillespie, 2016), 
the impact of such decisions would have never been rendered so clearly. 
The politics of platforms are now subject to much greater public debate. Regula-
tion is no longer so unfathomable, with some regions of the world (e.g., the EU 
and its member states) much more aggressive toward social media than others 
(Knight, 2018). In late 2019, the US Congress began to revisit CDA 230. At a 2019 
hearing, attorney Katherine Oyama of Google told legislators that Google and oth-
er firms were adding CDA 230-like clauses to antidemocratic and typically secret 
covenants such as multinational trade agreements. Rather than see CDA 230 fade 
into irrelevance, it seemed that the firms had found a way to expand its reach 
(House of Representatives, 2019). 
This constellation of internal policies, commercial practices, and US law has al-
lowed American social media firms to proliferate to a global scale, with conse-
quences for the rest of the world. American mores, jurisprudence and norms, con-
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flated with what is best for American firms, have been seamlessly packaged into 
technological and policy affordances, bolstered by content moderation favourable 
to the social media companies themselves. A uniquely American, even Silicon Val-
ley outlook has primacy in this arrangement, supported by a Washington, D.C. es-
tablishment with a revolving door in and out of the tech industry’s lobbying cadre. 
That cadre is gearing up not only for a battle against antitrust (Ryan, 2019), but al-
so to stave off attacks by other major economic forces such as Disney and IBM, 
who consider CDA 230 an unfair carve-out for the social media industry (McCabe, 
2020). This status quo is unlikely to withstand the next few years, but until change 
comes, content moderation and all its parts must be understood in the frame of 
the soft power, hegemonic force that it is. Long supported by the discretion and in-
demnity provided by CDA 230, its force and impact will only become more power-
ful and simultaneously less accountable to public scrutiny if it moves into secret 
US trade agreements. 
A regulatory turning point? The power of protest 
By Patricia Aufderheide 
We can learn from past movements intended to regulate savage capitalism, as we 
work toward new policies regulating today’s digital platforms. 
The power of platform moderation to act effectively as a regulator of daily life is 
now evident. This lands us firmly in the realm of policy—the question of what 
steps we take at a societal level to address the societal problems caused, inadver-
tently or not, by private actors. Corporate actors are already there, grappling daily 
with the opportunities and constraints of the political forces facing them, given 
the challenges their runaway inventions have created for them, and for us. We can 
also see the venues where action is and can be taken. There are so many: states, 
international agencies, multistakeholder organisations, standards bodies, public 
interest organisations and corporations themselves all want and have a role. As 
yet, as Suzor (2019) has noted, pressing for a human rights values framework, they 
largely have not expressed, much less agreed upon, any common values that 
should drive these regulatory processes—other than enthusiasm for innovation 
and (as Cohen [2019] has analysed) a neoliberal regulatory bias. 
Is this a moment of regulatory pivot—possibly even, to invoke a term Karl Polanyi 
(1944) gave us, the beginning of a double movement? Polanyi described a great 
transformation in English society, as “rational” market principles came to infuse cul-
ture, with the state combining with economic institutions to fundamentally change 
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the terms of daily life. The double movement was a regulatory pushback against its 
excesses, triggered by combined corporate and governmental concerns to maintain 
industrial capitalism. Movements to strengthen workers’ rights, control pollution, 
govern growth, and protect public health all threatened the future of industrial 
growth, without such regulations. None of the policies that resulted from these 
movements went unassailed by corporate forces eager to retain their autonomy, 
and all of them were sadly less-than. Indeed, some argue that the double move-
ment is ultimately nothing more than capitalist forces saving themselves (Cooper, 
2017). But these efforts did fundamentally change both how industrial capitalism 
developed and what people expected of businesses and of government. 
Perhaps we are approaching the double movement for this era, as Cohen (2019) 
suggests. We may be arriving at that point, she argues, in part through the tight re-
lationship between neoliberal politics and corporate fecklessness, creating enough 
social dysfunction to trigger demands (however inchoate) for pushback. We have 
already begun to see the first regulatory steps to address what Srnicek (2016) calls 
platform capitalism, but they are piecemeal. And, as is typical of political processes 
generally, they respond to crisis and have pushback of their own. Thus, Snowden's 
revelations have driven corporate decisions to invest more in security/encryption, 
which then created new privacy challenges, which aroused further legislative 
scrutiny. So far the debate about whether to rewrite or delete CDA 230 has largely 
revealed the confusion and ignorance of legislators and pundits about the work-
ings of both internet business and internet governance, but it will become more 
nuanced. 
If we are approaching such a moment, we can also look to the past for clues. The 
changes spurred by the Great Transformation’s double movement (Polanyi, 1944) 
were not the acts of a wise, caring, and forward-looking government. Rather, they 
resulted from social movements, public scandals, and political demands that soci-
ety not be subsumed into an economy. They were multifarious acts combining to 
become unignorable counterpressure. They were not coherent ideologically. Cata-
strophic economic failures and man-made disasters served as triggers. Smaller ver-
sions of this phenomenon have surfaced again and again in history—for instance, 
in the US with an early 20th century antitrust movement and policies that reined in 
the most egregious of the robber barons (Wu, 2018) and with the New Deal. During 
the 1930s, the US federal government responded not only to the economic cata-
strophe of the Great Depression but also to political mobilisation and public out-
rage demanding fundamental governmental and social change. In the end, society 
settled for regulatory measures that tempered savage capitalism in the US. 
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If we seek values-driven regulation that tempers the fecklessness that communica-
tions platforms now freely exhibit, then academic researchers, writers, journalists, 
and public interest organisations have their work cut out for them. Efforts such as 
the Santa Clara Principles, 4 currently under revision, are a small but welcome first 
step. The Internet Engineering Task Force’s internal struggles about how to inter-
pret human rights values in standards-setting for internet protocols are important, 
and deserve more attention—see, for instance, its creation of an HTTP status code, 
called 451 (named for Ray Bradbury’s novel about censorship), indicating that ma-
terial searched for was unavailable for censorship reasons (Cath & Floridi, p. 460). 
Facebook’s Oversight Board, already under close scrutiny, could be an important 
test case in establishing privately-ordered norms in content moderation. 
The evolving academic discussion of content moderation, figured not as a bad-ac-
tor problem about big platforms doing wrong but as a complex issue deserving in-
formed analysis, is important in the mix of activities that could drive toward a dou-
ble movement. Legislators and regulators deserve to get well-informed research, 
translated into usable, even actionable bullet points, along with the routine del-
uge of corporate lobbying. 
Conclusion 
By Tarleton Gillespie and Patricia Aufderheide 
Together, these observations suggest some important aims for moving this debate 
forward. 
It is vital that we expand the debate about content moderation. First, this means 
drawing lessons, insights, and suggestions from platforms other than Facebook; 
conversely, it means designing policy architectures that are suited to more than 
just Facebook. If moderation is endemic to the provision of information and hap-
pens everywhere across the network, then any solutions social media companies, 
scholars, or lawmakers propose—both to pernicious online harms and to the mis-
steps of platforms in addressing them—must appreciate their effect on the broader 
ecosystem. This certainly means tailoring different obligations to services of differ-
ent scales, purposes, and designs. But it also means recognising the peculiar dy-
namics of moderation across the whole of the information ecosystem. 
We need more thorough study of the impact of content moderation on different 
4. https://santaclaraprinciples.org/ 
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geographical, political and cultural communities. Research that focuses on users 
and takes either a platform-centric view of who those users are, or leans on the 
convenient research subject populations of university undergraduates or Mechani-
cal Turk workers, will fail to apprehend how differently site policies land for differ-
ent subcultures, linguistic communities, political tribes, and professions. It also 
means moving beyond a speech framework, to think about impact in terms of op-
portunities, values, ideologies, representations, norms, and cultural flourishing. 
Innovations in machine learning (ML) and automated content moderation have fo-
cused overwhelmingly on identification techniques: can software spot pornogra-
phy, harassment, or hate more accurately or more quickly than a human? Not only 
are there problems with these ambitions (Gillespie, 2020), but this work has 
crowded out other possible uses of ML and software techniques to support other 
dimensions of content moderation. Research should prioritise tools that might sup-
port human moderators, community managers, and individual users, to better ap-
prehend the contours of existing norms or the risk of certain patterns of behaviour, 
so that moderators and volunteers can make more informed decisions for them-
selves and their community. Data-scientific techniques might also help users and 
community managers better grasp how differently other communities experience 
similar content or behaviour, giving empathy and civic responsibility the support 
of data. 
As much as platform moderation could improve, it may also be a perennially im-
possible task to do in such a way that no one encounters harm, friction, or restric-
tion. Users of social media may have unreasonably high hopes for what their expe-
rience should be, largely because of the endless promises made by social media 
platforms that it would be so. We need to educate and adjust the expectations of 
users, to both understand what a difficult and vital process this is, to demand it be 
transparent and accountable, to recognise how they are implicated in it, and to 
prod their sense of agency and ownership of these sometimes unavoidable dilem-
mas. 
If regulators, researchers, journalists, and policy analysts are to address current 
and potential challenges in content moderation, they will need to build on empiri-
cal knowledge about actual corporate behaviour. Getting reliable empirical data 
from companies is a perpetual regulatory battle, in any realm. Both corporate im-
peratives and companies’ very real need to stay ahead of bad actors militate 
against transparency. Today’s transparency reports are an impoverished first step, 
the smallest of gestures in the right direction. In the same way that universities’ 
ethics boards and institutional review boards protect human subjects, it might be 
24 Internet Policy Review 9(4) | 2020
possible to design protective mechanisms for information sharing with certain cat-
egories of researchers; generations of cybersecurity research have shown that. De-
veloping skills in this area would also strengthen platforms’ ability to protect its 
users. As well, a regulatory requirement for some transparency across all platforms 
would perhaps in a salutary way change business conditions for all. 
Any regulatory proposal needs to acknowledge, at some level, the public-utility-
like nature of platforms (Rahman, 2018). Platforms now act, for most people, as 
some kind of essential service. They provide, usually with monopoly power, a func-
tion people have come to depend on for myriad daily needs. Regulators are the 
representatives of the public, defending their interests as a social entity rather 
than just as individual consumers. The public is not only the sum total of people 
who individually are jointly affected by governmental and corporate actions and 
who act on their representatives to address problems, but also the public of to-
morrow, whose present will be shaped by ours (Dewey, 1927). Platforms typically 
provide what most of their users think of as public access or a public space of dis-
course, while they retreat from responsibility for that role in their guise as private 
actors. If they are providing, across jurisdictions, what comes down to essential in-
formation services for people, they need to be treated as such. This would be a gi-
gantic step away from today’s regulatory practices; even obvious public utilities, 
such as electricity and telephone services, have been decoupled from many public 
utility responsibilities. But it only takes one crisis, such as Covid-19, to awaken the 
public to their profound dependence on private actors to connect them. Finally, 
any regulatory structures need to be normatively designed around values for just 
and open societies, and for the human rights values that enable them. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Our thanks to the organisers of AoIR 2019, and to all those who attended our 
roundtable sessions there. The vibrant discussion deeply informed the work 
presented here. Our thanks also to Nicolas Suzor, who offered superb contributions 
to the roundtable, but was unable, because of contractual conflicts, to contribute 
to the written version. As well, we thank our editors and reviewers at Internet 
Policy Review, for their thoughtful, constructive, and encouraging feedback. 
References 
Acker, A., & Murthy, D. (2018). Venmo: Understanding Mobile Payments as Social Media. Proceedings 
25 Gillespie et al.
of the 9th International Conference on Social Media and Society, 5–12. https://doi.org/10.1145/32178
04.3217892 
Aufderheide, P., & Jaszi, P. (2018). Reclaiming fair use: How to put balance back in copyright. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Banaji, S., Bhat, R., Agarwal, A., Passanha, N., & Pravin, M. S. (2019). WhatsApp vigilantes: An 
exploration of citizen reception and circulation of WhatsApp misinformation linked to mob violence in 
India [Report]. London School of Economics and Political Science. http://www.lse.ac.uk/media-and-c
ommunications/assets/documents/research/projects/WhatsApp-Misinformation-Report.pdf 
Bridy, A. (2020). The Price of closing the ‘value gap’: How the music industry hacked EU copyright 
reform. Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, 22, 323–358. 
Caetano, J. A., de Oliveira, J. F., Lima, H. S., Marques-Neto, H. T., Magno, G., Meira, W. Jr., & Almeida, 
V. A. F. (2018). Analyzing and characterizing political discussions in WhatsApp public groups. arXiv. 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.00397 
Caplan, R. (2019). Content or context moderation? Artisanal, community-reliant, and industrial 
approaches [Report]. Data & Society. https://datasociety.net/library/content-or-context-moderation/ 
Carmi, E. (2019). The Hidden listeners: Regulating the line from telephone operators to content 
moderators. International Journal of Communication, 13, 440–458. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/arti
cle/view/8588/0 
Carmi, E. (2020a). Media distortions: Understanding the power behind spam, noise and other deviant 
media. Peter Lang. 
Carmi, E. (2020b). Rhythmedia: A Study of Facebook immune system. Theory, Culture and Society, 
37(5), 119–138. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276420917466 
Cath, C., & Floridi, L. (2017). The Design of the Internet’s architecture by the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) and human rights. Science and Engineering Ethics, 23(2), 449–468. https://doi.org/
10.1007/s11948-016-9793-y 
Cohen, J. E. (2019). Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism. 
Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190246693.001.0001 
Cooper, M. (2017). Family values: Between neoliberalism and the new social conservatism. Zone Books. 
Crain, M. (2014). Financial markets and online advertising: Reevaluating the dotcom investment 
bubble. Information, Communication and Society, 17(3), 371–384. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118
X.2013.869615 
Crawford, K., & Gillespie, T. (2016). What Is a flag for? Social media reporting tools and the 
vocabulary of complaint. New Media & Society, 18(3), 410–428. https://doi.org/10.1177/146144481
4543163 
Dewey, J. (1927). The public and its problems. Henry Holt. 
Dwoskin, E., & Tiku, N. (2020, March 24). Facebook sent home thousands of human moderators due 
to the coronavirus. Now the algorithms are in charge. The Washington Post. https://www.washington
post.com/technology/2020/03/23/facebook-moderators-coronavirus/ 
Gerrard, Y. (2018). Beyond the hashtag: Circumventing content moderation on social media. New 
Media & Society, 20(12), 4492–4511. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818776611 
26 Internet Policy Review 9(4) | 2020
Gillespie, T. (2018). Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden 
Decisions that Shape Social Media. Yale University Press. 
Gorwa, R. (2019). The platform governance triangle: Conceptualising the informal regulation of 
online content. Internet Policy Review, 8(2), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.2.1407 
Gorwa, R., Binns, R., & Katzenbach, C. (2020). Algorithmic content moderation: Technical and 
political challenges in the automation of platform governance. Big Data & Society, 7(1). https://doi.o
rg/10.1177/2053951719897945 
Helmond, A. (2015). The platformization of the web: Making web data platform ready. Social Media 
+ Society, 1(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305115603080 
Hern, A. (2018, July 20). WhatsApp to Restrict Message forwarding After India Mob Lynchings. The 
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/20/whatsapp-to-limit-message-forwar
ding-after-india-mob-lynchings. 
Hofferberth, M. (Ed.). (2019). Corporate actors in global governance: Business as usual or new deal? 
Lynne Rienner. 
House of Representatives. (2019). Hearing on ‘fostering a healthier internet to protect consumers’. 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce. https://energycommerce.house.gov/committee-activit
y/hearings/hearing-on-fostering-a-healthier-internet-to-protect-consumers 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S 184, (United States Supreme Court 1964). 
Johns, A. (2020). This will be the WhatsApp election’: Crypto-publics and digital citizenship in 
Malaysia’s GE14 Election. First Monday, 25(1–6). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v25i12.10381 
Johnson, S. (2018, January 16). Why Cloudflare let an extremist stronghold burn. Wired. https://ww
w.wired.com/story/free-speech-issue-cloudflare/ 
Katz, M. (2017, October 17). These failed apps discovered a hidden rule of the Web. Wired. https://w
ww.wired.com/2017/03/these-failed-apps-discovered-a-hidden-rule-of-the-web/. 
Klonick, K. (2018). The New governors: The People, rules, and processes governing online speech. 
Harvard Law Review, 131, 1598–1670. https://harvardlawreview.org/2018/04/the-new-governors-th
e-people-rules-and-processes-governing-online-speech/ 
Knight, B. (2018, January 1). Germany Implements New Internet Hate Speech Crackdown. Deutsche 
Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-implements-new-internet-hate-speech-crackdown/a-4199
1590 
Krämer, J., & Stüdlein, N. (2019). Data portability, data disclosure and data-induced switching costs: 
Some unintended consequences of the General Data Protection Regulation. Economics Letters, 181, 
99–103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.015 
Kuo, L. (2019, November 27). TikTok ‘makeup tutorial’ goes viral with call to action on China’s 
treatment of Uighurs. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/nov/27/tiktok-
makeup-tutorial-conceals-call-to-action-on-chinas-treatment-of-uighurs 
Lu, D. (2019, September 27). WhatsApp Restrictions Slow the Spread of Fake News—But Don’t Stop 
It. New Scientist. https://www.newscientist.com/article/2217937-whatsapp-restrictions-slow-the-spr
ead-of-fake-news-but-dont-stop-it/ 
McCosker, A., & Gerrard, Y. (2020). Hashtagging depression on Instagram: Towards a more inclusive 
27 Gillespie et al.
mental health research methodology. New Media & Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/146144482092
1349 
Napoli, P., & Caplan, R. (2017). Why media companies insist they’re not media companies, why 
they’re wrong, and why it matters. First Monday, 22(5). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v22i5.7051 
Nardone, M. (2015, August 30). Getting banned from the App Store was the best thing that happened 
to us. https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/30/getting-banned-from-the-app-store-was-the-best-thing-t
hat-happened-to-us/. 
Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Kalogeropoulos, A., Levy, D., & Nielsen, R. K. (2019). Reuters Institute 
Digital News Report 2019 [Report]. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. https://reutersinstit
ute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-06/DNR_2019_FINAL_0.pdf 
Nieborg, D. B. (2015). Crushing candy: The free-to-play game in its connective commodity form. 
Social Media + Society, 1(2), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305115621932 
Nieborg, D. B., & Helmond, A. (2018). The political economy of Facebook’s platformization in the 
mobile ecosystem: Facebook Messenger as a platform instance. Media, Culture & Society, 41(2), 
196–218. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443718818384 
Plantin, J.-C., & Punathambekar, A. (2018). Digital media infrastructures: Pipes, platforms, and 
politics. Media, Culture & Society, 41(2), 163–174. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443718818376 
Plantin, Jean-Christophe, Lagoze, C., Edwards, P. N., & Sandvig, C. (2016). Infrastructure studies 
meet platform studies in the age of Google and Facebook. New Media & Society, 20(1), 293–310. htt
ps://doi.org/10.1177/1461444816661553 
Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation. Farrar and Rinehart. 
Prince, M. (2017, August 16). Why we terminated Daily Stormer [Blog post]. The Cloudfare Blog. http
s://blog.cloudflare.com/why-we-terminated-daily-stormer/ 
Rahman, K. S. (2018). The new utilities: Private power, social infrastructure, and the revival of the 
public utility concept. Cardozo Law Review, 39(5), 1621–1689. http://cardozolawreview.com/wp-cont
ent/uploads/2018/07/RAHMAN.39.5.2.pdf 
Rajput, R., Saha, A., Kumari, S., Janyala, S., TA, J., Janardhanan, A., Pandey, P., & Ghose, D. (2017, 
August 16). Murderous mob—9 states, 27 killings, one year: And a pattern to the lynchings. The 
Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/murderous-mob-lynching-incidents-in-india-
dhule-whatsapp-rumour-5247741/ 
Roberts, S. T. (2017, March 8). Social Media’s Silent Filter. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2017/03/commercial-content-moderation/518796/ 
Roberts, S. T. (2019). Behind the screen: Content moderation in the shadows of social media. Yale 
University Press. 
Ruchaud, N., & Dugelay, J. L. (2016). Automatic face anonymization in visual data: Are we really 
well protected? Electronic Imaging, 2016(15), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.2352/ISSN.2470-1173.2016.1
5.IPAS-181 
Samuelson, P. (2019). Europe’s controversial digital copyright directive finalized. Communications of 
the ACM, 62(11), 24–27. https://doi.org/10.1145/3363179 
Sharma, M. (2019, December 5). Exclusive: What Personal Data Protection Bill 2019 is likely to 
28 Internet Policy Review 9(4) | 2020
propose. India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/exclusive-what-personal-data-protectio
n-bill-2019-is-likely-to-propose-1625472-2019-12-05 
Shead, S. (2017, February 8). Inside the crash of Fling, the startup whose founder partied on an 
island while his company burned through $21 million. Business Insider. https://www.businessinside
r.com/how-fling-social-media-app-died-2016-11 
Sinnreich, A. (2018). Four crises in algorithmic governance. In J. C. Joerden, R. Schmücker, & E. 
Ortland (Eds.), Annual Review of Law and Ethics (Vol. 26, pp. 190–199). Duncker & Humblot. 
Srnicek, N. (2016). Platform capitalism. Polity Press. 
Steinberg, M. (2020). LINE as Super App: Platformization in East Asia. Social Media + Society, 6(2). ht
tps://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120933285 
Stewart, R. (2017, February 28). Facebook Tweaks Its Algorithm to Give More Prominence to Posts 
with ‘Reactions.’ Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-tweaks-algorithm-to-gi
ve-more-value-to-posts-with-reactions-2017-2 
Swartz, L. (2020). New Money: How Payment Became Social Media. Yale University Press. 
Taylor, A. (2018, August 1). The Automation Charade. Logic Magazine, 5. https://logicmag.io/failure/t
he-automation-charade/ 
Treré, E. (2020). The banality of WhatsApp: On the everyday politics of backstage activism in Mexico 
and Spain. First Monday, 25(12). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v25i12.10404 
Tusikov, N. (2019). Defunding hate: PayPal’s regulation of hate groups. Surveillance & Society, 17(1/
2), 46–53. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v17i1/2.12908 
van Dijck, J., Nieborg, D., & Poell, T. (2019). Reframing platform power. Internet Policy Review, 8(2). h
ttps://doi.org/10.14763/2019.2.1414 
Vibert, F. (2007). The rise of the unelected: Democracy and the new separation of powers. Cambridge 
University Press. 
West, S. M. (2018). Censored, Suspended, Shadowbanned: User interpretations of content 
moderation on social media platforms. New Media & Society, 20(11), 4366–4383. https://doi.org/1
0.1177/1461444818773059 
WhatsApp. (2019). Stopping Abuse: How WhatsApp fights bulk messaging and automated behavior 
[White Paper]. WhatsApp FAQ. https://web.archive.org/web/20190618205325/https://www.whatsap
p.com/safety/WA_StoppingAbuse_Whitepaper_020418_Update.pdf 
WhatsApp. (2020, April 7). Keeping WhatsApp personal and private [Blog post]. WhatsApp Blog. http
s://blog.whatsapp.com/Keeping-WhatsApp-Personal-and-Private?lang=en 
Willson, M., & Leaver, T. (Eds.). (2016). Social, Casual and Mobile Games: The Changing Gaming 
Landscape. Bloomsbury Academic. 
Wu, T. (2018). The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age. Columbia Global Reports. 
Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of 
power. Profile Books. 
Zuckerberg, M. (2019, March 6). A privacy-focused vision for social networking [Post]. https://www.fac
ebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-vision-for-social-networking/101567005700
29 Gillespie et al.
96634/ 
P ublished b y in c ooperation with
30 Internet Policy Review 9(4) | 2020
